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A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE *
A SUGGESTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROGRAMMNE COM-
MITTEE OF THE THIRD HAGUE CONFERENCE.
James L. Tryon, Secretary of the Massachusetts Peace Society,
Director of the New England Department of the
American Peace Society.
A Permanent Court of international Justice-what does that
mean? Not the creation of a new international court. We have
one such court already and two more courts proposed. The first
of these, called the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established
at The Hague in I899, has eleven decisions to its credit. The
second, the Court of Arbitral Justice, the draft for which was
accepted by the nations at The Hague in 19o7, would-be in service
to-day, as an alternative to the first, if an agreement could have
been reached as to a method of appointing its judges. The third,
the International Court of Prize, also a measure of 19o7, will be
utilized when its judges are appointed, and when a naval war
makes its services necessary. The projects of all three courts are
monuments to a century of the steady progress of the nations in
substituting law for war in the settlement of their disputes. These
courts should remain substantially as they are, but should be
properly related to one another in their respective jurisdictions,
each being so organized as best to serve the purpose for which it
is intended. The Permanent Court of Arbitration should be for
the voluntary settlement of semi-political disputes, or for any
controversies that nations are unwilling to submit to the Court of
Arbitral Justice. The Court of Arbitral Justice, a better name
* While Mr. Tryon was engaged in writing a series of articles on
The Hague Conference and related questions for the YALE L.AM JouR.-
NAL, he was interrupted by a request from Hon. Elihu Root, President of
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article on "A Permanent Court of International Justice," as an American
suggestion fcr the Programme Committee of the Third Hague Conference-
This article, read at the meeting of the Society last April, has been revised
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would be the Court of International Justice, like the International
Prize Court, should have an obligatory jurisdiction and be strictlyjudicial in its procedure; but, for the sake of prompt and econom-
ical administration, both courts should be combined in one insti-
tution with two chambers.
Some changes should be made in the procedure of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration. A system of orderly pleading is
recommended by Mr. Dennis, the agent of the United States in
the Orinoco Steamship Company case, and would seem to be
needed. Case and counter case should be separated from argu-
ment. There should be a fixed order of arguments; evidence,
instead of being introduced into them for the first time, should be
confined to the case and counter case, or otherwise formally pre-
sented beforehand. It is suggested that provision should be
made for interlocutory motions and for discovery.
Mr. Dennis also tells us that the arbitrators who are chosen to
sit on a case should be required by the terms of submission to
know the languages that are to be used in a trial. If a judge is
ignorant of a language with which both he and his colleagues are
expected to be familiar, he will be at a disadvantage, and, by caus-
ing extra translations to be made, will add to the work of agent
and counsel, as well as to the expense of litigation. This sug-
gestion would, therefore, seem proper for adoption.
The third or fifth member of a tribunal should be selected, not
by the arbitrators already chosen, but by the governments them-
selves. The governments, with an ample knowledge of men at
their command, and secretarial facilities to carry on correspon-
dence, are in a much better position intelligently to appoint a
proper umpire than the arbitrators, who, as a rule, do their work
under considerable limitations.
The question has been raised whether nationals should ever
again be allowed to sit on a tribunal of The Hague Court. Under
the present rules, but one national is allowed to each litigant on a
board of five judges, or on a board of three, which means con-
siderable advance in the conception of the constitution of an inter-
national tribunal as compared with the past when commissions
were made up entirely of nationals, sometimes with one of them
as umpire. But with notable exceptions, such as the Fisheries
and Grisbadarna cases, nationals, when used on arbitral tribunals,
have shown a tendency to oppose decisions injurious to their
country's interest. It was so in the Alabama case, from the
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main decision of which Sir Alexander Cockburn dissented, in the
Japanese House Tax case, from the decision of which the Japan-
ese member expressed vigorous dissent, and in the North Sea
inquiry, to the findings of which the Russian member took excep-
tions in some particulars. Mr. Ralston, who is positively op-
posed to the use of nationals, states that they showed bias in the
cases tried by the Venezuela Claims Commissions and declares
that the chief value of an arbitral tribunal in the development of
law and justice is practically reduced to the views of its neutral
members. Mr. Ralston also objects to the appointment of citi-
zens of a subordinate state of a litigating nation, as they may
favor the views of the statesmen at the head of their superior
government, with whom they are likely to sympathize. It is also
said that nationals when on a tribunal are apt to influence their
neutral associates with whom they are in contact for the several
days or weeks in which a case is being tried. They are inclined,
on the whole, to act as counsel rather than as judges, and thus to
bring arbitration as a legal proceeding into discredit.
What shall we say to these familiar criticisms as to the use of
nationals, not only in arbitral tribunals generally, but also on
those of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague?
Nations, as a rule, have been unwilling to submit their disputes
entirely to the judgment of neutrals. Neutrals are strangers,
and are apt to be -unacquainted with the laws "of the litigating
states. For example, questions came up in the Fisheries dispute
in which knowledge of a system of law peculiar to the United
States and Great Britain required the services of American and
British judges. The matter of saving national pride may also to
some extent enter into the problem of the constitution of a tri-
bunal. Pride can perhaps better be saved by a national than by
a foreigner. In a case like the Casablanca incident, nationals
performed invaluable service in composing a difference over
which there was sensitive feeling. If the Permanent Court of
Arbitration were to be the only court of nations, it might be
advisable to propose that nationals be finally excluded from its
tribunal and used on outside boards of arbitration; but, if there is
to be a Court of Arbitral Justice also, there is still, in view of the
Fisheries and the Casablanca cases, so successfully tried under
the present arrangement, an argument for continuing nationals on
the present court when, for special reasons, they are desired.
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In order to further eliminate partiality from the decisions of
a tribunal, it is also proposed that the method of choosing neutral
as well as national judges be revised. Neutrals are accused of
taking the legal attitude of the power that appoints them and of
having a sense of obligation to fulfill like the national himself
when it comes to a matter of saving their patron's face. To
remove this danger, it is suggested by Mr. Ralston that a litigant
nation should have the right of challenging the appointees of its
opponent without, however, being compelled to give reasons, as a
disclosure of objections might lead to unpleasantness. Thus a
litigating nation would have a right similar to that enjoyed by a
jury lawyer when he challenges an incompetent, prejudiced or
otherwise unacceptable juror. Again, to meet practically the
same objection, it is proposed by Mr. McKenny that, where there
is to be a tribunal of say five members, each side shall nominate
a list of judges for it, then each side shall choose two from the
other's list. It is argued that this method would prevent either
party from gaining an influence over the appointees, who would
thus be obligated to neither party, but rather would be the choice
of both parties. And again to guard against undue influence, it
is proposed that when the arbitrators are informed of their ap-
pointment they be first notified jointly by the litigating powers, or
by the bureau at The Hague, as they are expected to be, and not
by the litigating powers separately, lest an attempt be made to gain
favor by sending the appointees messages of thanks. These
suggestions as to amendments in procedure would appear to tend
to impartiality, and might well be recommended for consideration.
If, however, the procedure in the choice of arbitrators is
amended, it will still be a roundabout and time-consuming process,
and the. so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration will lack the
convenience that could be secured by a really permanent court.
It must always be remembered that the judges, instead of being
ready to try a case, have to be summoned for it after it has come
up, and must be brought together from far distant countries at
great expense.
The expense of an arbitration, though it bears no comparison
to a war, perhaps the very thing a litigation is designed to avoid,
is almost a deterrent. The cost of organizing and maintaining
the court, according to the present plan, is borne by the litigating
nations. Each party not only chooses but pays its own judges.
It is said, however, that a good percentage of the expense of the
court is sometimes deducted from the award of an individual
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-claimant for whom the litigating state intervenes: but it is pro-
posed that hereafter such deduction should not be made, as it is
a hardship upon the individual. A court that is supported from
a common international fund, just as municipal courts are sup-
ported by the funds of a State, and not by the parties at issue,
is greatly to be desired.
Besides these considerations with regard to details in the
administration of the court, there is the fundamental objection
that courts of arbitration are partial because they follow the prin-
ciples of diplomacy, instead of law, in the settlement of inter-
national disputes. The judges, taking the place of negotiators
and splitting the difference, render a compromise decision, instead
of giving a judgment based upon facts and law, according to the
record before them. The Hague Court itself, the most highly
developed court of arbitration ever used, has been subjected to
the same criticism. There are, however, publicists who, while
admitting that arbitration has in the past utilized the methods of
diplomacy, deny that the present court has resorted to them, and
maintain that it is legal in its methods. By The Hague procedure,
this court does not require professional judges, but simply men
who are competent in international law, many of whom, when
the full list of appointees is examined, are found to be statesmen
and diplomatists rather than jurists. It must be answered that
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, whatever the legal attain-
ments of its judges, cannot be impeached in respect to the legality
of the great majority of its decisions.
The decision of the Casablanca case, though legal in respect
to the points of international law that were passed upon, had
about it such an appearance of restraint, and contained such in-
genious expressions of opinion, as to make it in effect a diplo-
matic aajustment; but it saved the honor of both parties and made
peace between them in a way that was mutually acceptable to
themselves and of benefit to the world. But the fact that the
decisions of the present court have on the whole been legal, that
such a distinguished jurist as Professor Lammasch has insisted
when under criticism that they have been legal, and that they have
been pronounced by men who have been really selected for their
high juristic standing, is an argument that the nations in their
practical experience are ready for a long step forward in the
development from arbitral to judicial methods.
But the best of arbitration tribunals, even those that sit at The
Hague, are only temporary. They meet, and pass upon a case,
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each one in an isolated kind of way, and it is believed that they
make less science of law than would be made by a really perma-
nent tribunal constituted of the same jurists all the time, growing
in experience, blending divergent legal systems into a harmonious
whole, publishing opinions with which their later decisions should
agree, or from which they should develop new principles, as-
sisted by a recognized bar of learned counsellors, especially quali-
fied to serve an international court. It is believed, that if a court
of nations could be established like the Supreme Court of the
United States, or like other national courts held in high respect
among governments, more cases would be attracted to it; war
would the sooner pass away, and the gigantic armaments which
now tax the financial resources of the people would begin to dis-
appear.
But that the world is ready for a new court is abundantly evi-
dent in the accepted plan of the Court of Arbitral Justice. That
is a court that is really permanent, that calls for judges by pro-
fession, that pays them out of a common fund, that has no place
for diplomacy, that demands juridical decisions, that includes
representation of the principal languages, and that recognizes all
systems of procedure and law. However grateful we may be
for the present court as a means of securing peace and justice, we
ought to-day to reassert our faith in the court that has been pro-
posed, and to insist that, as was intended, it shall be put into oper-
ation as an alternate court to the Court of Arbitration.
The questions, about which there were differences in 19o7 with
regard to the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, were too difficult
to be settled in the few weeks that were allowed for the Second
Hague Conference, but since we of the United States believe in
the juridical equality of nations, we are glad of the opportunity
that we have had for further discussion of this topic. It has
enabled us to take a larger view than we have ever had of the
whole problem of the composition of the court. The principle is
now made clear that, in the choice of a tribunal for the nations,
none of the States should have a right to claim upon it an indi-
vidual judge; each member of it should represent all of the
affiliated States and be chosen from them at large. This is the
juridical as opposed to the arbitral principle, and underlies the
selection of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
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Had the Supreme Court of the United States, as we believe the
most successful Federal Court in history, been organized under
a plan that gave to any of the United States a claim to a perpetual
representative on it, or even a representative by rotation, that
tribunal would have been, in principle, not a judicial but rather a
legislative or a diplomatic court, a court of arbitration like that
of the old Confederation, of which each litigant chooses his own
judges, which is the very kind of institution upon which we, like
our forefathers, wish to improve. When we choose the judges
for the Court of Arbitral Justice, let there be, as there is under
the Constitution ot the United States, where the Senate is given
the right of confirmation, a uniform principle of selection in
which each State shall have an equal voice, but let the judges be
chosen for their fitness, for their learning in the languages, for
their familiarity with the various systems of law to be used, and
for their competence as professional judges. Let them not be
chosen because of their nationality, or on any principle that makes
for inequality among the States. If, however, there should seem
to be a need of it, there might, as has been suggested, be a safe-
guarding provision that not more than one judge should be ap-
pointed from one nation at a time.
But how shall the tribunal be appointed ? Nobody can yet sug-
gest an acceptable plan, but it has been proposed, and it is sub-
mitted that there is merit in the proposal, that the judges be ap-
pointed by the President of the next Hague Conference with the
approval of its members, or that they should be elected by the
Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, with such ratification as may be
required by the constitutions of the various nations.
This leads to the consideration of possible amendments to the
proposed plan for the Court of Arbitral Justice. I hesitate to
offer any. To do so may seem presumptuous, but I would ven-
ture to suggest that, if changes are to be considered, they be of a
kind to make the court, even more distinctively than it is, a judi-
cial court-a court of law and equity, instead of an advanced
development of the institution for arbitration now in use.
First of all, it is submitted that the name "arbitral" might well
be dropped from its title, as one that is better suited to the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration, and that the name "Court of Inter-
national Justice" be put in its place, for it is justice, not arbitra-
tion, not compromise, that we want.
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It is submitted that the number of judges be reduced. Fifteen
judges, though only a fraction of the total number of the present
court, might prove unwieldy, a's well as expensive. There is
danger, too, that with so many judges, they might take sides for
or against a decision, and not act with proper independence.
Would not a tribunal of nine, the size of the United States
Supreme Court, be more suitable? A tribunal of five, the num-
ber in the Geneva and the Fisheries cases, the normal number of
an arbitral tribunal to-day, has proved acceptable for the most
important litigations which the nations have ever had. This,
with a chief justice in addition, is the number with which the
Supreme Court of the United States began its great work.
It is objected that the delegation of three of the members of
the Court of Arbitral Justice to take cases between annual ses-
sions is likely, owing to the less expense involved in making use
of it, instead of fifteen judges, to lead to its too frequent use;
but, if this danger be real, it is an argument for a smaller court
as well as a court awaiting its case.
It is said regretfully that we are embarrassed by the require-
ment that the judges for the Court of Arbitral Justice should be,
so far as possible, chosen from the list of men now serving on the
Permanent Court of Arbitration; but, as several members of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration have proved themselves to be
acceptable international judges, and as the provision for giving
preference is not absolute, it need not be removed.
It is pointed out with reason that the salaries to be allowed the
judges of the Court of Arbitral Justice (about two thousand,
four hundred dollars a year, as an honorarium, and forty dollars a
day, when in session only, with an allowance for expenses), are
too small to compensate highly skilled jurists. These men, in
a position of such high responsibility, might be paid as much at
least as are the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States,
which is about twelve thousand dollars a year. The salaries of
the judges ought to be paid regardless of sessions; for, when not
holding court, they should give their whole time to gaining the
vast legal knowledge which their duties will require. Besides,
when judges accept service on the Court of Arbitral Justice, they
are excluded from other government appointment, and for some
of them this may mean a sacrifice.
The question arises with regard to the relation of this court to
the International Prize Court, which is also a court of law and
210
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equity, but of a type that is even more advanced than is the Court
of Arbitral Justice. Why could not both courts be combined
ifn one? If we may refer again to the system of this country, our
Supreme Court acts as a prize court, and why could not the Court
of Arbitral Justice so act in special session? We can find in our
Supreme Court judges who, although .they are not specialists, are
competent, in matters of admiralty and prize law, and, if we have
the whole world to draw from, there should be no difficulty in
securing competent men to fill, as occasion may demand, the re-
quirements of both international courts. Article *16 of the draft
for the Court of Arbitral Justice prepares the way for the union
of these courts by saying: "The judges and deputy judges, mem-
bers of the Judicial Arbitration Court, can also exercise the func-
tions of judge and deputy judge in the.International Prize Court."
But, to remove doubts in the minds of other nations as to the
practicability of a single court with two chambers, one of them of
specialist character, naval officers might act as assessors, sitting
with the court on prize cases, but without a vote, which is what
they are expected to do according to the convention for the
Tnternational Prize Court, or they might be called as expert wit-
nesses. Secretary Knox, who has honored the peace cause not
only by assisting President Taft in the negotiation of the recent
arbitration treaties, but by his enterprising advocacy of the new
court, has endeavored to bring about a combination similar to that
proposed, and it is significant that he reports progress in his
uhdertaking. Such a combination would seem to be not only
feasible, but in the line of economy and prompt administration.
If we can get along with one court, and have that a court always
ready for either kind of case, that arising in peace or that arising
in war, as oppose4 to having two courts, one in acttal operation
and .he other on paper, its members having to be specially sum-
moned from all over the world when needed, entailing an extra
charge on the nations for salaries and travelipg expenses, why not
do so? May we not then suggest this as a topic of discussion to
the Programme Committee of the Third Hague Conference, and
call their attention to the practical efficiency of the Supreme Court
of the United States as an institution having several functions,
one of them to adjudicate cases of prize?
Shall the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitral Justice be obliga-
tory or voluntary or both, and specified or unspecified? It is sub-
mitted that it would be well to give this court an obligatory juris-
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diction of such controversies of the nations as may be decided hy
the principles of law and equity, provided there is no formulLted
code, definite rule of international law, or treaty to go by. It
would then correspond to the jurisdiction provided for the Court
of Prize, and, in spirit, would resemble the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States.- If any category of cases
be specified, we might include cases relating to the interpretation
of treaties, pecuniary claims, and contractual debts, such as were
proposed in the universal treaty of arbitration in i9o7, or pro-
vied for in the Porter-Drago Convention. And besides cases-
ogf the first instance, we might send to this court cases of appeal
where there has been essential error or denial of justice in inter-
national cases tried by national courts, by mixed commissions, or
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Already we have se~n
in the Oriqoco Steamship case and in the Pious Fund case, both
of which had been preyiously adjudicated by international com-
pissiorls, that the present Permanent Court of Arbitration maybe successfully used as a cpurt of appeal. It would be carryirg,
the idea of appeal but a step farther to make the Court of Arbitral
Justice a court of last resort. i3ut, quite apart frqm a jurisdic-
tiqn granted to the court in the instrument that creates it, there
might also be left to it the large facultative jurisdiction which it
npow has, so that, by special treaties, nations could refer to it any
kind of judicial case, according to their pleasure. We might
then leave the Permanent Court of Arbitration substantially As
it is, with its own large voluntary jurisdiction, in the hope that it
might continue to prove useful to nations, who might tak@ t9 it
§emi-pplitical contrpversies, or cases like the Casablanca incident,
lyhich have a diplomatic character, and who might fgr any re4sonprefer the present court to the Court of Arbitral Justice.
It is desirable that the Court of Arbitral Justice should be
adopted by a11 the nations of the world. In any event, however,
provision should be pnade that, when a certain number of tho
who are ready for it express their willingness to adopt it, it shall
into operation, with the understanding that others may adhere
to it later when they are prepared to abide by its provisions. It
should not be possible for a few nations to obstruct a measure of
so great importance to the world as a Supreme International
Court of law and equity.
To some nations, judging by the recent action of the United
States Senate in amending the arbitration treaties to protect the
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Monroe Doctrine and other political ideas, it may seem necessary
,expressly to make some reservations, when joining the court, if
it is given an extensive obligatory jurisdiction. If reservations
are to be made, they might take the form of resolutions of inter-
pretation or limitation, with the understanding that they must have
the assent of all the other States that are parties to the court, or that
such resolutions are notice of the political position of any given
nation in regard to the scope and powers of the court.
Whether, at this time, there should be inserted in the scheme
for the Court of Arbitral Justice a declaration of rights for the
protection of individuals as well as of States is also a question
that is worthy of consideration; for, in some way, these, rights
should be guaranteed. A legally limited judicial tribunal goes
hand in hand with a conception of sovereignty resting with the
p-eople rather than in kings and parliaments, which is a European
conception, the governments under the European system being
themselves unlimited sources of power and law. It is feared
that without proper safeguards these systems might clash, to the
-detriment of American institutions and to the unalienable rights of
men; or on the other hand, work the overthrow of the European
systems of government. For this reason it has also been pro-
posed that the whole theory of arbitration be left on an advisory
basis as being safest for this country, and most consistent with the
institutions of other nations who could with propriety accept
advisory, instead of compulsory decisions. This distinction raises
a large question which we may not be called upon today to face,
but is worthy of serious study by students of the science of gov-
ernment.
But what shall insure the success of an obligatory court if estab-
lished? Shall we provide it with sanctions? There are those who
believe that such a court can never be what it ought to be without
the sanction of force, just as there are those who distrust inter-
national law itself because it is not imposed upon the nations
by a superior power, and who, therefore, are loathe to recognize it
as law at all, believing that law is only law when by physical force
you can make people obey it. But neither the world as a whole,
nor a judicial union of several nations, is ready for the authorized
enforcement of the decrees of an international court by armies
and navies, or even by an international police; for, though we
-might with great economy use an international police today in
place of so many large and separate armies and navies of the
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nations, we are not yet ready for that idea which, even more than
the judicial court, implies international federation.
But it will be answered that municipal law has behind it in
theory the police, the sheriff, the national guard, the regular army,
and we see from time to time that it is necessary to protect with
the militia an accused criminal in a jail when threatened by a
mob; we also see that sheriffs and marshals sometimes have to.
be employed to enforce a process. But more than one hundred
years of experience with the Supreme Court of the United States
teaches us that, although that tribunal has behind it in theory the
military power of the national government, the court itself has
no army at its own command and no civil police of any conse-
quence, and that with one exception, the case of the sloop Active,
when a posse of two thousand men was organized to carry out an
order of the court -in the State of Pennsylvania, there has been
no call whatever for it to have a large organized force at its dis-
posal; nor is there ever likely to be one. Recalcitrant States are
a thing of the past. They or their citizens now pay over their
money or otherwise accede to the decrees of the court without
ever a thought of constraint by force.
But what has so successfully carried along the Supreme Court
of the United States, an international court first for thirteen and
now for forty-nine sovereign States? Public opinion. But what
has just as peacefully supported international arbitration courts
and commissions in the several hundred cases, some of them of
great magnitude, that have been tried in the past hundred years ?
Public opinion. And the nations need nothing else to compel
their obedience to an international court than public opinion-
"The force of law," says Mr. Root, "is in the public opinion which
prescribes it." There is also a very powerful sanction in the
agreement that, under the present arrangement, any two nations,
may make to submit a case to arbitration. The very submission
of a question to a tribunal means an intention to comply with the
terms of the award to be rendered, provided, of course, that it is.
in accordance with the protocol, and is based upon recognized.
principles of law and equity properly applying to the case. It is
implied in The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, which is applicable to the draft for the
Court of Arbitral Justice, that the nations shall carry out the.
awards of arbitration in good faith. They are explicitly pledged
to do so in the Convention relating to the International Prize
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Court. Of equally great influence as a sanction would be the
contractual agreement to be entered into by the nations in finally
adopting the new Court of International Justice. The agreement
of the American States to accept the terms of union in the Con-
stitution of the United States, and with them the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, has been one of the strongest sanctions in
support of our Court.
But the objection is frequently made that international law is
not only without sanction, but that it is vague, and the desire is
expressed that there should be a code of law as a necessary
adjunct to the court. Indeed, a code first and a court afterward,
as was shown to be necessary in the case of the International
Prize Court. This desire has associated with it a real effort in
which we, of this country, have taken especial interest since the
formation of the International Law Association forty or more
years ago, and more particularly in one of the recent annual meet-
ings of the American Society of International Law. It is note-
worthy that international law tends to become codified, as witness,
not only the Declaration of Paris, the Declaration of London, The
Hague Conventions, but the rules of various international unions
and congresses, such as those that deal with weights and meas-
ures, submarine cables, and the slave and liquor trade in Africa.
It may seem wise for the publicists of America to recommend to
the Committee on the Programme of the Third Hague Conference
the appointment of a commission on the codification of the law of
nations, or to advise that such commission be constituted as soon
as possible, and set to work with a view of reporting to the Third
Hague Conference a code for adoption; but, with or without a
code, the proposed Court of International Justice should be insti-
tuted, and may act both safely and effectively, just as the highest
national tribunals and The Hague tribunals have acted, adminis-
tering international law as it is today, taking it from its many
sQurces, formulated and unformulated, the statutory and the cus-
tomary law of the society of nations, and declaring it in the con-
fidence that if a decision is just it will meet with universal accept-
ance. In the words of Dr. Scott, our dauntless champion of the
Court of Arbitral Justice, "The current of history is with us.




The idea of a court of nations goes back at least as far as
Henry IV, Em6ric Cruc6, Grotius, and William Penn; but, as
outlined by them and their successors, the early schemes for an
international court provided for an assembly of ambassadors act-
ing as judges rather than for a tribunal of jurists. William Ladd,
in his Congress of Nations, made a definite departure from the
suggestions of all these writers by separating the idea of a court
from that of a congress. In his plan, the congress was to codify
the law of nations, the court to apply it. In the nineteenth cen-
tury arbitration made great progress apart from the peace propa-
ganda, as it was used by many of the governments, particularly
the United States and Great Britain, for the pacific settlement of
their disputes. This method of adjudicating international con-
troversies, however, was open to the criticism that arbitral tri-
bunals came to their decisions by compromise, the judges taking
the place of negotiators and settling the questions before them by
diplomatic adjustment. This method of arriving at a decision
led to the fear of partiality, and prevented the submission of
international questions, which might otherwise have been adjudi-
cated had there been an international court of jurists acting upon
known principles of law, and deciding their cases according to the
records before them. This was.pointed out in a memorable
address, entitled "The American Sentiment of Humanity", by
Hon. Elihu Root, at the New York Peace Congress of 1907; see
report p. 34. Mr. Root, who was then Secretary of State, em-
bodied the leading thought of his address in his Instructions to
the American Delegates to the Second Hague Conference, with
the result that they proposed the Court of Arbitral Justice, ajudicial court based upon Mr. Root's idea. This court, adopted
in principle by the nations, marks a steady advance in the con-
ception of an international court from a diplomatic to a judicial
body, Mr. Root having eliminated as an objectionable feature
the idea of compromise. It will be seen, upon examination of
the plans both of Mr. Ladd and Mr. Root, that they were in-
fluenced by the success of the United States Supreme Court,
which is purely judicial in its character.
Among American publicists, the most voluminous and sugges-
tive writer on the Court of Arbitral Justice is Dr. James Brown
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Scott, who, as the technical delegate of the United States at the
Second Hague Conference, elaborated and championed the scheme
of the court. For his writings and addresses, see 2 Anmerican
Journal of International Law, 772, the Reports of the Mohonk
Arbitration Conferences since 19o8; the Pennsylvania Peace Con-
gress Report, 19o8, p. 98; the Chicago Peace Congress Report,
1909, p. 234, ("Some Subjects Likely to be Discussed at the Third
Hague Conference"); the New England Peace Congress Report,
1910, p. 83, "Oration on Elihu Burritt," and Dr. Scott's volume of
American Address at the Second Hague Conference, published by
Ginn & Company, 191o. See also his article on the International
Court of Prize in 5 American Journal of International Law, 302,
which is closely connected in organization and historical develop-
ment with the Court of Arbitral Justice; and "The Evolution of a
Permanent International Judiciary" in the April, 1912, number of
the American Journal of International Law.
For The Hague Conventions and other action relating to the
three courts, already established or projected at The Hague, see 2
James Brown Scott's The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and
19o7, and A. Pearce Higgins' The Hague Peace Conferences.
Introductory and explanatory matter will be found in i Scott's
Hague Peace Conferences, and in Higgins' invaluable work. See
also William I. Hull's The Two Hague Conferences, and Thomas
J. Lawrence's Principles of International Law. Articles on these
courts by the present writer are as follows: "The Proposed High
Court of Nations", YALE LAW JOURNAL, January, 191o; "The
International Prize Court and Code", Ibid., June, 1911; and "The
Hague Peace System in Operation", Ibid, November, 191I. The
latter article takes up the cases decided by the Permanent Court
of Arbitration. The student of the subject will profit by reading
discussions of these courts in the Proceedings of the American
Society of International Law for 19o8, 19o9, and 1912. He will
also find related topics in the development of international jus-
tice, treated in the Proceedings of i9IO and 1911, the latter for
a code of international law especially. Valuable and inspiring
sources of information and suggestion will be found in the reports
of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International
Disputes for 191o and 1911, in which are papers on the problem
of a Court of International justice, with helpful analogies to the
Supreme Court of the United States. For continuation of the
subject see the report on the session of December, 1912. See
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generally the articles or addresses in the report for 191o, by Hon.
Elihu Root, Hon. Henry B. Brown, Frederick D. McKenny,
Alpheus H. Snow, Professor Eugene Wambaugh, Hon. Jackson
H. Ralston, Hon. Andrew J. Montague, Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin,
President Charles W. Eliot, and Hon. William Dudley Foulke.
Mr. Theodore Marburg wrote a valuable summary of the thought
of that conference, which should be consulted in order to get a
consensus of American opinion. The pamphlets by the Judicial
Settlement Society reproduce some of the addresses already re-
ferred to, but "An International Court of Justice the Next Step",
by George Grafton Wilson, is newly printed. This is useful as
marking the state of contemporary thought on the subject. For
another article which brings the subject up to date see in No. io
of the same series, "The Court of Arbitral Justice", by Dr. Scott.
This contains an extract from the Proc~s-Verbal of the afternoon
session of the Institute of International Law of August 28, 1912,
showing the approval by that body and by Professor Lammasch of
the proposed judicial court.
Other articles referred to in the text are as follows: "Com-
promise, the Great Defect of Arbitration", by Hon. William Cul-
len Dennis, ii Columbia Law Review, p. 509; (Mr. Dennis
thinks that, for the present, a code of procedure ii international
arbitration is an even more imperative need than a code of sub-
stantive law.) William Cullen Dennis, 5 American Journal of
International Law, pp. 59-63; Thomas Raeburn White, "The
Underlying Principles Which Should Govern the Method of
Appointing Judges of the International Court of Arbitral Justice",
Mohonk Arbitration Report, 1911, p. lO2; Alpheus Henry Snow,
"Legal Limitation of Arbitral Tribunals", 6o University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review, December, 1911. This article should be
carefully compared with Mr. Snow's article on the "Development
of the American Doctrine of the Jurisdiction of Courts Over
States", I Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, iOo.
For discussions of the problem of an international court of
justice by delegates of The Hague Conferences, the best original
sources are tie proceedings which are in French. Brief resumes
of these discussions in English will be found in i Scott's "Hague
Peace Conferences", Higgins' "Hague Peace Conferences", and
Frederick W. Holls' "The Peace Conference at The Hague".
For an official discussion of the problem of the relation of the
Court of Arbitral Justice to the International Prize Court, see
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identic circular note by Hon. Philander C. Knox, Secretary of
State, in 4.American Journal of International Law, p. IO2. The
combination of these courts in one, which is suggested by the
present writer, is also proposed by Secretary Knox with this dif-
ference, however, that the foundation "of the plan of the. Secre-
tary of State is the International Prize Court, as that institution
is already in a more advanced state of acceptance than the Court
of Arbitral Justice, while the present writer's scheme makes the
Court of Arbitral Justice the foundation. The plans ftrther dif-
fer in that he first utilizes the scheme of judges already accepted
for cases of prize, which permits nations to have individual repre-
sentatives on the tribunal, while the second proposes that the
judiciary be chosen from the nations at large, none of them to
have the right to claim territorial representation by an individual
judge.
